…most harnesses inject things into the context window without your consent or knowledge? Some of those are probably important things the harness creator thought needed to be in every prompt, but when…
…The gateway is still an attack surface to think about, and prompt injection isn't solved by anyone yet (nor does it look like it ever can be), but Hermes treats security…
…The prompt had already produced two genuinely usable planners, so all Gemini really needed to do was follow instructions and inject a little personality of its own into the experience, right? Right…
…If it does, the whole thing gets injected directly into the prompt - no retrieval at all actually, just full content handed to the model in one go. If the document is too…
…Finally, the model also shows significant improvement in agentic safety, meaning it's a lot better at recognizing and refusing prompt injection attacks when you're using it as an agent. Opus…
…Heck, I don't even let Gemini touch my Gmail because the current state of guardrails and prompt injection is lacking. But a local installation of Dify, that's powered by a…
…If it does, the whole thing gets injected directly into the prompt, so there's no retrieval and the full content is handed to the model in one go. If the document…
…Prompt injection is the other thing. My calendar has inputs I don't fully control, such as meeting invites, shared events, and descriptions written by other people. A malicious, or even just…
…Handing over control of your inbox to an agentic AI also has one more big security issue that might be unfixable. LLMs are vulnerable to prompt injection, where you can hijack the…
…Agentic browser tools have broad permissions by design, so limiting when they're actually live matters for reducing the prompt injection risk. And after that, the browser worked smooth as butter in…